יובל דיין להורדה

The language of power often reveals more than it intends. In a rare moment of candour on March 7, the US president, Donald Trump, described the confrontation with Iran as “a big chess game at a very high level … I’m dealing with very smart players … high-level intellect. High, very high-IQ people.”

If Iran is, by Trump’s own admission, a “high-level” opponent, then the sudden revival of a 15-point plan previously rejected by Iran a year ago suggests a disconnect between how the adversary is understood and how it is being approached. It’s a plan already examined in negotiation by Iran and dismissed as unrealistic and coercive. Despite this, the Trump administration is once again framing the “roadmap” as a pathway to de-escalation. Tehran has once again dismissed the gambit as Washington “negotiating with itself” – reinforcing the perception that the US is attempting to impose terms rather than negotiate them.

The US president is right about one thing – Iran is not an opponent that can be easily dismissed or overwhelmed. Trump’s own description is a tacit acknowledgement that this is a far more capable and complex adversary than those the US has faced in past Middle Eastern wars, such as Iraq. And that is why the odds are increasingly stacked against the United States and Israel.

This conflict reflects a familiar but flawed imperial assumption: that overwhelming military force can compensate for strategic misunderstanding. The US and Israel appear to have misjudged not only Iran’s capabilities, but the political, economic and historical terrain on which this war is being fought.

Unlike Iraq, Iran is a deeply embedded and adaptable regional power. It has resilient institutions, networks of influence, and the capacity to impose asymmetric costs across multiple theatres. It knows how to manage maximum pressure.

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The most immediate problem is lack of legitimacy. This war has authorisation from neither the United Nations or, in the case of America, the US Congress. Further, US intelligence assessments indicate Iran was not rebuilding its nuclear programme following earlier strikes – contradicting one of Washington’s justifications for war. The resignation of Joe Kent as head of the National Counterterrorism Center on March 17 was even more revealing. In his resignation letter, Kent insisted that Iran posed no imminent threat.

This effectively collapses one of the original narratives underpinning the US decision to start the war – a further blow to legitimacy.

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A majority of Americans oppose the war, reflecting deep fatigue after Iraq and Afghanistan – hardly ideal conditions for what increasingly looks like another "forever war” in the Middle East. Current polling shows Trump’s Republicans trailing the Democrats ahead of the all-important midterm elections in November.

The war is both militarily uncertain and politically unsustainable. International allied support is also eroding. The United Kingdom — often trumpeted as Washington’s closest partner — has limited itself to defensive coordination, while Germany and France have distanced themselves from offensive operations. European allies also declined a US request to deploy naval forces to secure the strait of Hormuz. This reflects not just disagreement, but a deeper loss of trust in US leadership and strategic judgement.

US influence has long depended on legitimacy as much as force. That reservoir is now rapidly draining. Global confidence is falling, while images of civilian casualties — including over 160 schoolchildren killed in an airstrike on the first day of the war – have shocked international onlookers. Rather than reinforcing leadership, this war is accelerating its erosion.

Israel faces a parallel crisis of legitimacy – one that began in Gaza and has now deepened. The war in Gaza severely damaged its global standing, with sustained civilian casualties and humanitarian devastation drawing unprecedented criticism, even among traditional allies. This confrontation with Iran compounds that decline.

Striking Iran during active negotiations — for the second time — reinforces the perception that escalation is preferred over diplomacy.

The conduct of the war compounds the problem. The assassinations of Iranian leaders, framed as tactical victories, are strategic failures. They have unified rather than destabilised Iran. Mass pro-regime demonstrations illustrate how external aggression can consolidate internal legitimacy.

The issue is no longer just the conduct of the war, but the credibility of the conflict itself. Regardless of how impressive the US and Israeli military are, it doesn’t compensate for reputational collapse. When building support for a conflict like this – domestically and internationally – legitimacy is a strategic asset. Once eroded across multiple conflicts, it is extraordinarily difficult to rebuild.

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Rather than stabilising the system, US actions are fragmenting it. Allies are distancing themselves, adversaries are adapting, and neutral states are hedging.

The most decisive factor may be economic. The war is already destabilising global markets – driving up oil prices, inflation, and volatility at levels that combine the effects of 1970s and Ukraine war oil shocks.

This is a war that cannot be contained geographically nor economically. The deployment of 2,500 US marines to the Middle East (and reports that up to another 3,000 paratroopers will also be sent), reportedly with plans to secure Kharg Island – and with it Iran’s most important oil infrastructure – would be a dangerous escalation.

For Gulf states, the assumption that the US can guarantee security is increasingly questioned. Some states are reportedly now looking to diversify their partnerships and turning toward China and Russia, mirroring post-Iraq shifts, when US failure opened space for alternative powers.

Wars are not won by destroying capabilities alone, but by securing sustainable and legitimate political outcomes. On both counts, the US and Israel are falling short.

Iran, by contrast, does not need military victory. It only needs to endure, impose costs, and outlast its adversaries. This is the logic of asymmetric conflict: the weaker power wins by not losing, while the stronger one loses when the costs of continuing become unsustainable.

This dynamic is already visible. Having escalated rapidly, Trump now appears to be searching for an off-ramp — reviving proposals and signalling openness to negotiation. But he is doing so from a position of diminishing leverage. In contrast, Iran’s ability to threaten energy flows, absorb pressure, and shape the tempo of escalation means it increasingly holds key strategic cards. The longer the war continues, the more that balance tilts.

Empires rarely recognise when they begin to lose. They escalate, double down, and insist victory is near. But by the time the costs become undeniable – economic crisis, political fragmentation, global isolation – it is already too late. The US and Israel may win battles. But they may be losing the war that matters: legitimacy, stability and long-term influence.

And, as history suggests, that loss may not only define the limits of their power, but mark a broader shift in how power itself is judged, constrained, and resisted.